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Marquitz: A Survey of Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1

XI. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Arising out of and in the Course of Employment
1. Acts of Third Persons
In McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church,1 the Minnesota
Supreme Court dismissed a tort action (using the exclusive
remedy clause of the Workers' Compensation Act) commenced
by the director of a homeless shelter who was raped by a shelter
client.2 On April 4, 1989, while working in her office at the
church's homeless shelter, Diane McGowan was raped by shelter
client, Eulalio Hernandez-Perez. 3 McGowan had come into
contact with her assailant on two occasions before the rape.4
After the second incident, McGowan informed all of the staff
that she did not want to be left alone with Hernandez-Perez.5
On April 4, 1989, a church custodian told McGowan that
the pastor was having trouble with a disruptive man (HernandezPerez) in the assembly hall.6 McGowan escorted HernandezPerez to her office to talk to him. Hernandez-Perez became
upset, pulled the phone cord out of the wall, closed the office
door and raped McGowan. 7
McGowan argued that Hernandez-Perez raped her for
purely personal reasons unrelated to her work.8 She maintained
that Hernandez-Perez knew her prior to the assault; he developed a personal interest in her and made advances toward her.9
The supreme court rejected McGowan's claim. The court
held that the assault occurred in the course and scope of the
employee's employment, concluding that the assault arose "solely

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

527 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. 1995).
Id. at 834.
Id. at 832.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 833.
Id.
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out of McGowan's activities as an employee."1" The court relied
on the fact that McGowan never had any contact with her
assailant outside the workplace and that the assault occurred
during work hours while McGowan was directly engaged in the
performance of her work duties." In reaching this result, the
court rejected the notion that the controlling consideration2 in
deciding the issue is the motive or intent of the employee.'
RecreationalActivities and Employer Sponsored Social
Events
An injury sustained during travel from an employee's home
and workplace is ordinarily not compensable pursuant to the
Workers' Compensation Act,'" unless the employee is on the
employer's premises. 4 However, in McConville v. City of St.
Paul,5 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that injuries incurred by an employee in a motor vehicle accident while being
transported from a park where employees participated in the
employer's wellness program to the place of employment were
not excluded from coverage under the Workers' Compensation
2.

Act.

16

Audrey A. McConville was employed as the office manager
of the records division of the police department of the City of St.
Paul.'
Her employer permitted her to take lunch breaks
during working hours, but the employee was required to keep
the department informed of her whereabouts if she was on
call.

18

To encourage its employees to exercise, the employer
This voluntary
sponsored a "Walk in the Park" program."
activity usually occurred three days per week from 11:00 a.m. to

10. Id. at 834.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. McConville v. City of St. Paul, 528 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Minn. 1995); see, e.g.,
Lundgaard v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 306 Minn. 421, 422, 237 N.W.2d 617, 619
(1975).
14. See Starrett v. Pier Foundry, 488 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1992).
15. 528 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1995).
16. Id. at 232.
17. Id. at 230.
18. Id. at 230-31.
19. Id. at 231.
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noon.20 The employer provided transportation to and from the
park in a police car." On August 29, 1989, McConville was
returning to work in a police paddy wagon when the car was
involved in an accident. 22 McConville sustained a low back
injury.2

The Minnesota Supreme Court has excluded coverage
under the Workers' Compensation Act for injuries the employee
sustained returning home from either an employer-sponsored
social gathering or an athletic event. 4 However, when the
employer regularly transports the employee to and from the
workplace, injuries sustained by the employee while a passenger
in the vehicle furnished by and under the control of the
employer are personal injuries arising out of and in the course
25 They are subject to the Workers' Compensaof employment.
26
tion Act.

The court treated the employer-provided vehicle as an
extension of the workplace.2 1 "[T]he employee who rides in
the vehicle at the employer's direction is in the employer's
service even if the employer regards the transportation as a
courtesy to the employee ....

,""8 The Workers' Compensation

Act thus covers the employee. 29 The supreme court also
maintained that the application of the Workers' Compensation
Act to injuries sustained while being "transported" by the
does not depend on the point of origin of the
employer
30
journey.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
(1974);
25.
26.

MINN.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Ramaker v. Marjae, Inc., 301 Minn 58, 60, 221 N.W.2d 125, 127
Youngberg v. Donlin Co., 264 Minn. 421, 427, 119 N.W.2d 746, 750 (1963).
McConville, 528 N.W.2d at 231.
Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subd. 16 (1994).
Injuries incurred while participating in voluntary recreational
programs sponsored by the employer, including health promotion
programs, athletic events, parties, and picnics, do not arise out of and
in the course of the employment even though the employer pays
some or all of the cost of the program. This exclusion does not
apply in the event that the injured employee was ordered or assigned
by the employer to participate in the program.
STAT. § 176.021, subd. 9 (1994).
McConville, 528 N.W.2d at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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3. Workers' Compensation Act Applies to Transitory
Employees
In Vaughn v. Nelson Brothers Construction,31 Justice
Gardebring, writing for the Minnesota Supreme Court, held that
the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act applied to a knee
injury suffered by a worker while in Wisconsin, even though the
worker was a transitory or traveling employee. 2
Jesse H. Vaughn was hired in Minnesota by Nelson Brothers
Construction, a Minnesota employer, as a permanent, full-time,
traveling fixture superintendent in January 1990. 33 Vaughn
coordinated and supervised the installation of fixtures at Target
stores located in many states.34 Installation projects at each
store were structured according to time schedules. When one
project was completed, the traveling fixture superintendent
would move on to the next project.3 5
On June 4, 1992, Vaughn was working on an eight- or nine36
week project in Wisconsin when he sustained a knee injury.
He filed a claim for benefits under the Minnesota Workers'
Compensation Act. 37 The compensation judge determined
Vaughn was entitled to various benefits under the Act.' The
compensation judge based jurisdiction on Minnesota Statutes
section 176.041, subdivision 3 (1992), which provides, "If an
employee hired in this state by a Minnesota employer, receives
an injury while temporarily employed outside of this state, such
injury shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter."39 On
appeal, the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA)
reversed, deciding Minnesota did not have jurisdiction.'
The supreme court adopted the "employment relation test"
to cover employees like Mr. Vaughn who are always at a temporary location. 41 The court noted that Minnesota's provision

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

520 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1994).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 395-96.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 176.041, subd. 3 (1994); see also Vaughn, 520 N.W.2d at 396.

40.

Vaughn, 520 N.W.2d at 396.

41.

Id. at 397.
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concerning temporary out-of-state employment does not precisely
fit the circumstance posed by transient or traveling employees.4 2
However, the court maintained that too narrow a coverage would
pose the danger of no coverage by a state. 3
The fact that a worker may spend a significant amount of
time in one state does not detract from the essentially transitory
nature of the activity in which they engage." The amount of
time one spends in a given locale should be a factor to consider,
but should not be controlling.4 5 The facility that controlled
Vaughn and his assignments was in Minnesota.' The source of
his renumeration was in Minnesota.4 7 Further, Vaughn traveled
to Minnesota for administrative and centralized tasks and his
employment was not "centralized and fixed" clearly in another
state.'
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that
Vaughn was reasonably within the scope of the statutory
objective.4 9
B.

Wage Loss Benefits-Retirement Defense

A longstanding issue in Minnesota workers' compensation
law was the extent to which a retirement defense could be used
to limit the duration of a permanent total disability claim. The
issue appears to have been resolved by the Minnesota Supreme
5" the court held as follows:
Court. In Behrens v. City of Fairmont,
Inasmuch as subsequent efforts to end permanent total
benefits "at retirement" have been unsuccessful ... we think
it is reasonably clear that under the law in effect on the date
of injury in this case [1973 and 1988], although permanent
total benefits may be reduced by the federal social security
disability benefits paid after the $25,000 threshold is met,
permanent total benefits do not cease altogether when the
social security benefits are converted to old age benefits or
when the employee attains the age at which he had hoped to

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

48.

Id. (citing 4 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,

§ 87.42(b) (1994)).
49. Id.
50.

533 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1995).
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retire had he not been injured."'
In Behrens a self-insured employer filed a petition to vacate
an award of permanent total benefits based on worker's attainment of age sixty-five. 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that although permanent total benefits may be reduced by the
federal social security disability benefits paid after the $25,000
threshold is met, permanent total benefits do not cease altogether when social security benefits are converted to old age benefits
or when the employee attains the age at which he hoped to
retire if he was not injured.5"
James H. Behrens sustained compensable back injuries in
1973 and 1988 while employed by the City of Fairmont. 4 On
January 19, 1989, at age sixty, Behrens stopped working because
of his work injuries and sought permanent total compensation.55 Prior to his injury, Behrens indicated he intended to
work until age sixty-five.5 6
On April 1, 1993, the city filed a notice of intention to
discontinue benefits as of April 26, 1993, Behrens' sixty-fifth
birthday based on Behrens' intention to retire on his birthday as
well as his entitlement to social security benefits. 7 The workers' compensation judge dismissed the matter, concluding that
because Behrens had been declared permanently disabled in
1992 and no petition to vacate the earlier order had been filed,
principles of resjudicata precluded relitigating the issue.5 8 The
city's remedy was to request reopening for modification of the
prior declaration of permanent total disability pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 174.461. 5'
In 1983 the Minnesota Legislature enacted sweeping
changes that restructured the delivery of permanent partial
benefits and set durational limits on temporary total benefits on
retirement.' This legislation, however, was not directed at the
permanently-disabled worker whose weekly permanent total

51. Id. at
52. Id. at
53. Id. at
54. Id. at
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at

856-57.
855.
857.
855.

856.
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benefits were unchanged by the 1983 reform. 61
The Behrens case, at least for injuries occurring before
October 1, 1995 (when substantial limits on permanent total
disability benefits were included in the Act), can be reasonably
interpreted as prohibiting the assertion of "retirement" as a
means of limiting the temporal duration of permanent total.62
The Minnesota Supreme Court clarified the application of the
retirement defense and specifically held the presumption
inapplicable to cases of permanent total disability benefits.63
C. Permanent PartialDisability
Ordinarily, permanent partial disability benefits should be
apportioned pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 176.101,
subdivision 4(a) (1994). In Stone v. Lakehead Constructors,' the
Minnesota Supreme Court applied equitable principles to
apportion liability for benefits equally among four employers.6 5
The court reasoned that where the claimant's injuries followed
so closely on the heels of the prior injuries that the employee's
condition never stabilized sufficiently tojustify contemporaneous
rating of permanent disability, and where the difference between
the highest and lowest hourly wages on the four
jobs was thirty66
seven cents, equitable principles should apply.
During a nineteen-month period, thirty-four-year-old
construction carpenter Mark Stone sustained a series of low back
67
injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment.
Each injury occurred during the course and scope of Stone's
employment for a different employer.'
Stone first developed
low back pain on May 24, 1990, while moving water-soaked wood
for Lakehead Constructors.6 9 He did not seek medical treat70
ment.
Stone then worked for Oxford Construction.
While

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 856-57.
Stone v. Lakehead Constructors, 533 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1995).
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
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picking up a fifty to one-hundred-pound toolbox, he felt a pop
weeks
in his back in the same area that he injured a couple of
73
earlier.7 2 Stone received treatment from a chiropractor.
Stone next went to work for Max Gray Construction.74 In
September 1990, he was fitted for a back brace, which he wore
until he was laid off in the fall of 1990.71 In August 1991, after
returning to work for Max Gray, Stone suffered a third low back
injury but again lost no time from work.76
In November or early December 1991, Stone began working
for Ray Riihiluoma on a construction project at HibbingChisholm Airport.77 He again encountered78low back pain while
working on a hangar construction project.
Finally, in late January and in February 1992, Stone worked
sporadically delivering fuel oil for Mancuso Oil.79 After working a total of 10.65 hours, Stone had to quit because of low back
s°
pain.
Six physicians offered testimony on Stone's claim." All
agreed that his work at Mancuso Oil was not a factor in his
present condition.12 Several doctors found that the four workrelated injuries were substantial contributing factors to Stone's
Stone's impairment was
condition of spondylolisthesis s3
diagnosed at 10.5%.84
Because the difference between Stone's highest and lowest
hourly wage rate was no more than thirty-seven cents, the court
determined that it was not necessary nor advantageous to require
assignment of5 a permanency rating applicable to each of the
four injuries.8
The court maintained that the diversity of medical opinions
concerning allocation of permanent partial disability demonstrat72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
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ed not only the difficulty of allocation, but that such allocation
will be open to the same complaints of arbitrariness or insufficiency of the evidence that will have been made with equitable
apportionment.8 6 Therefore the court held that there was no
reason to recalculate the compensation for permanent partial
disability when the more complicated statutory format should7
produce the same amount of compensation to the employee.
D. Medical Benefits
Pursuant to Minnesota Rules 5221.6010, treatment parameters were established on an emergency basis effective May 18,
1993.' These emergency treatment parameters had a duration
of one year. As of May 13, 1994, these emergency rules
lapsed. 9 On January 4, 1995, permanent workers' compensation treatment parameter rules were adopted by the Department
of Labor and Industry.9"
In Hirsch v. Bartley-Lindsay Co.,91 the Minnesota Supreme
Court determined the validity of the treatment parameters.
Hirsch challenged the treatment parameters on the grounds that
they exceeded the authority that had been delegated to the
Commissioner by the enabling legislation, that they were in
conflict with other relevant aspects of the Workers' Compensation Act, and that they infringed on the decisional independence
of compensation judges.92
The supreme court determined that the enabling legislation
granted to the Commissioner the power to adopt emergency and
permanent rules establishing standards and procedures for
The rules were used to
health care provider treatment.9"
determine whether a health care provider was performing
procedures or services at a frequency that was excessive,
unnecessary, or inappropriate based upon the accepted standards of medical care.9 4 The enabling legislation also allowed

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. JAY T. HARTMAN AND THOMAS D. MoTfAz, THE MINNESOTA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION DESKBOOK U7-5 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 537 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 1995).
92. Id. at 485.
93. Id. at 485-86 (citing MINN. STAT. § 176.83, subd. 5 (1994)).
94. Id. at 486 (citing MINN. STAT. § 176.83, subd. 5 (1994)).
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for a denial of payment for medical services that were in fact
excessive, unnecessary, or inappropriate based upon the
standards established by the rules. 5
The court went on to examine the language found in
Minnesota Statutes section 176.135 (1), which states that medical
care is to be provided "at the time of injury and any time
thereafter ....

"' The court recognized that this language in

the statute does not imply any durational residency limit on
medical treatment. 7 The court determined that any durational
limits on medical care established by the treatment parameters
were in conflict with the statute.98 The statute prevails in such
a conflict.99
The second issue addressed by the supreme court was the
exclusive list of reasons for departing from the medical treatment parameters."° The court was concerned with the judicial
model of decision making. Minnesota Statutes section 176.135,
subdivision 1 (e), places the question of the necessity for medical
treatment within the discretionary power of a compensation
judge.'' The court decided that an exclusive list of departure
rules unduly infringed on the discretionary power of the judge,
and thus exceeded the authority granted to him by the legisla02
ture.1

As a result, the court held that the rules purported to be
binding regulations.1 3
As such, they0 4 exceeded legislative
authorization and were declared invalid.1
E. Third Party Practice
1. Payments Made Pursuantto Mistake
In Kubiszewski v. St. John,"5 an injured firefighter sustained
a mild lumbar strain when he was hit by truck in a work-related

95.
96.

Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 176.83, subd. 5 (1994)).
MINN. STAT. § 176.135, subd. 1 (1994).

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Hirsch, 537 N.W.2d at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

102.

Id. at 487.

103. Id.
104.
105.

Id.
518 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1994).
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accident." 6 The city accepted liability and began paying
workers' compensation benefits including wage loss compensation and medical expenses. 0 7
Less than one month later the employee suffered injuries in
a non-work related automobile accident."0 The employee did
not inform the city of the non-work related accident and
continued to receive benefits. 9 The employer assumed the
employee's disability continued from the first accident." 0
The employee made a third party recovery arising out of the
first injury, and the employer received partial reimbursement of
its payments."' After settling with the Suburban Hennepin
Regional Park District, the employee sued the driver of the car
in the non-work related accident."' The employer attempted
to assert3 a subrogation claim against the proceeds of that
11

action.

The supreme court reversed the trial court and the court of
appeals, by holding that the employer's right of indemnification
does not apply with respect to benefits mistakenly paid for a nonwork related injury." 4 The court stated that the employer
could have investigated the claim and denied liability if the
injury was "determined not to be within the scope and course of
employment" or could have terminated benefits "upon filing of
a notice of denial of liability within thirty days of notice or
knowledge."" 5 None of the benefits the city paid for injuries
relating to the second accident were paid pursuant to the
Workers' Compensation Act." 6 Therefore the provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act, including those giving an
employer the right of indemnity, did not apply." 7

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 6.
Id.

114. Id.at 6-7.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 6 (citing MINN. STAT. § 176.221, subd. 1 (1992)).
Id.at 7.
Id.
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2. Settlement Agreement
In Karnes v. Quality Pork Processors,"" the Minnesota Su-

preme Court placed into question the enforceability of a
provision in a workers' compensation stipulation foreclosing an
employee's cause of action under Minnesota Statutes section
176.82.119 The court reversed a decision of the court of appeals that the Workers' Compensation Act sanctions settlement
agreements that conform with the act, are fair and reasonable,
are approved by the compensation judge, and do not preclude
reopening of an award12 in order to assure compensation in
proportion to disability.
In 1989, while working for Quality Pork Processors (Quality
Pork), Bonnie Karnes sustained a compensable injury resulting
in bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. 2 1 On July 16, 1990, she
returned to light duty work. 12 2 However, three days later, she
sustained a work-related right wrist fracture which was surgically
reduced in August of 1990.123
A year later the parties entered into a settlement agree12
ment. 124 Karnes approved the settlement for all claims.
The agreement stated that Karnes had voluntarily terminated her
employment with Quality Pork and that she had not retained
legal counsel. 126 The agreement was approved by a compensation judge
and an award was entered pursuant to the agree127
ment.
Six weeks later, Karnes applied for unemployment compensation, which was denied based upon a determination that she
128
separated from employment due to medical restrictions.
Karnes brought an action for retaliatory discharge in violation of

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

532 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1995).
See id. at 562.
See id. at 563.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Minnesota Statutes section 176.82 (1994).129
Quality Pork
claimed the district court lacked jurisdiction over the matter
because it was necessary that the settlement agreement be first
vacated by the WCCA.'"
The supreme court noted that the WCCA does not have
jurisdiction over matters outside the workers' compensation
system.13 1 When a party pleads a release contained in a workers' compensation settlement as an affirmative defense in a
subsequent retaliatory discharge action, it is the district court,
1 32
not the WCCA, that has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.
3. Employee are not Required to Prove Specific Work
Activities Caused Specific Symptoms

In Steffen v. Target Stores,133 the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that an employee was not required to prove that specific
work activities caused specific symptoms which led cumulatively
and ultimately to disability.1 34 Additionally, the employee was
entitled to a remand to determine whether
the injury was
135
gradually caused by repetitive work activity.
From August 1989 through January 7, 1991, Laurie Steffen
worked for Target Stores as a "zoner," ajob that required her to
arrange and clean various departments of the employer's retail
stores.136 The job also involved periodic work stocking shelves
with merchandise; and on two occasions, she assisted in unloading semi-trailers. 37 After leaving for a period of time, Steffen
Id. at 561-62. Minnesota Statutes § 176.82 states as follows:
Any person discharging or threatening to discharge an employee for
seeking workers' compensation benefits or in any manner intentionally obstructing an employee seeking workers' compensation benefits
is liable in a civil action for damages incurred by the employee
including any diminution in workers' compensation benefits caused
by a violation of this section including costs and reasonable attorney
fees, and for punitive damages not to exceed three times the amount
of any compensation benefit to which the employee is entitled.
Damages awarded under this section shall not be offset by any
workers' compensation benefits to which the employee is entitled.
MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (1994).
130. Karnes, 532 N.W.2d at 562.
131. Id. at 563; see also MINN. STAT. § 175A.01, subd. 5 (1994).
132. Id.
133. 517 N.W.2d 579 (Minn. 1994).
134. Id. at 581.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 580.
137. Id.
129.
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returned to Target as a "ticketer," a job that involved opening
boxes of merchandise, placing price tags on each item, returning
the merchandise to the boxes, placing the boxes on a pallet, and
moving the pallet to the department.13 8 Steffen described the
ticketerjob as more 139
difficult because it involved more bending,
lifting, and stooping.
In early June of 1991, Steffen began noticing pain and
swelling in her leg."4 After various tests and studies, it was
determined that Steffen suffered a herniated L5-S1 disk."' Dr.
Ahlberg, the examining medical consultant, concluded it was
most likely that Steffen sustained a herniated disc as a result of
work activities without any specific injury, but secondary disk
herniation resulted from an episode of backbending and
lifting."
The compensation judge denied the employee's
claim, finding the medical evidence insufficient. 4 3 The WCCA
affirmed on appeal.1"
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that where there is
objective medical evidence coupled with the opinion of a
medical expert and where the ultimate objective is the attainment of substantial justice according to the purposes of the
Workers' Compensation Act, application of the WCCA standard
requiring a causal relationship between the specific work and the
specific injury casts an unfair burden on the person injured by
the duties of employment. 45 The Supreme Court appropriately remanded the matter for a hearing."
KevinJ. Marquitz

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 581.
Id.
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